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Article 6

As much detail as we get into some aspects of
Rienstra’s life (including adventures in baby poop or
depression after weeks of needy-baby syndrome), we
don’t see some of the daily struggles that should be
there. For example, her husband makes her crazy sometimes, but what about the older kids, especially during
the early, exhausting days of teaching a new baby to
nurse and keep a livable schedule? Or, how do she and
her husband manage the daily details of negotiating
work schedules and other responsibilities? Even with
these omissions, this book assures the reader—myself
included—that being a professional, Christian woman

isn’t straightforward for anyone. Rienstra doesn’t offer
easy answers but passes on her hard-won wisdom and
wonder to those who accompany her. The reader walks
alongside Rienstra, much as one would with an open,
honest friend, and learns much from the fellowship.

Sherri Lantinga (lantinga@dordt.edu) won the race and
now teaches psychology at Dordt College in Sioux
Center, IA. She does the cleaning, and her husband
Nick is in charge of food as they together raise three
red-heads.

Hermann Giliomee, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. Cape Town, South Africa and Charlottesville,
Virginia: Tafelberg Publishers and the University of Virginia Press, 2003. Xix+698 pp. Paper, R 295,
$39.50. ISBN:0-8139-2237-2. Reviewed by Jack R. Van Der Slik, Professor of Political Studies emeritus, University of Illinois at Springfield.
For hyphenated Americans like myself who take
pleasure and pride in the word Dutch as the leading
word in such a construction, The Afrikaners will be an
absorbing read. It is a saga of immense proportions that
parades before the reader an engaging list of people,
places, and concepts that are at once familiar, distant,
foreboding, challenging, and distasteful. Among the
people are Jan van Riebeeck, Andries Pretorius, Paul
Kruger (“Oom Paul”), H. F. Verwoerd, Jan Smuts, Cecil
Rhodes, Lord Kitchener, Abraham Kuyper, Joseph
Chamberlain, several Bothas, F.W. De Klerk, and
Nelson Mandela. Even if we do not know them all, we
recognize them as players in a significant history that
both imposed and endured great suffering. They played
their parts in places with echoing names such as Cape
Town, the Blood River, the Orange Free State, Zululand,
Johannesburg, Witwatersrand, Kimberley, Bloemfontein,
and Sharpeville. They forged a vocabulary that made
known to us Hottentots, colored, trekboers, Broederbond, Voortrekkers, and apartheid.
My anticipation to read this book was whetted by a
recent visit to South Africa. My maternal grandfather
came with five children to this country after the turn of
the last century. It was his second choice. His father forbade his earlier desire to go to South Africa to fight on
the side of the Boers. My wife’s paternal grandfather
came here, but in the 1890s, during a wave of Dutch
migration to South Africa, his older brother chose that
destination. When we met our distant cousins, they
immediately engaged our love, fellowship, and compassion. We could absorb only parts of the stories of their
lives. This book fills out the picture of both their pride
and their pain.
Hermann Giliomee's magnum opus is not called The

History of South Africa or The Saving of a Beloved
Country, a play on the title of Alan Patton’s Cry, the
Beloved Country. This book is The Afrikaners:
Biography of a People. I note the alternatives because
a history would require a dispassionate description of
popular movements and conflicts over a landmass that
does not identify the author with the players. The other
title would call for a subjective scrutiny that expresses
emotional accord and slanted sensitivity. Giliomee has
given us a book that is better than either of those. It is a
cultural tapestry that identifies with a unique people but
sees with analytical eyes the range of their aspirations,
risk taking, victories, reversals, sins, and suffering.
One of the ideas that the book explains is the uniqueness of the Afrikaners. Of course, it can be argued that
any particular people are special in some manner.
Giliomee observes “a sense of being Afrikaners rather
than being Dutch or French or German had crystallized
by the end of the 18th century” (51). The “volk” spread
east and north from the original Cape Town settlement,
tending their livestock and finding farmland. They were
people of limited culture and literacy. No Dutch language newspaper emerged until 1830, but its name
helped affirm the identity of the community it served:
De Zuid-Afrikaan. The Afrikaner identity was as much
about what it was not as what it was. It, of course, was
distant from that of the natives – Hottentots, Khoikhoi,
Xhosa, Zulus, and others. It was different from that of
the “colored,” those people of mixed race emerging
from early miscegenation in the Cape community. It
contrasted sharply that of the English. Among the
Afrikaners the English were occupiers who exuded an
offensive air of superiority and cultural dominance. The
legality of their occupation was by assignment from the
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Congress of Vienna in 1815. By contrast, the early
Afrikaners “were a rural, isolated, relatively backward
people with only a few who received more than a rudimentary education” (195). However, they viewed themselves as permanent husbandmen of the land and the
country. For the most part, the English did not. Despite
what they might own in South Africa, they kept their ties
to England as home. While Europeaness was the heritage of the Afrikaners, they identified with South Africa
as their homeland. In the nineteenth century, they
extended their reach and distribution by trekking north
and east for land and agricultural opportunity.
Remembered as the Voortrekkers, they suffered hardships of the trek and massacres at the hands of Zulu
warriors.
A historical highlight of Afrikaner history was the
Covenant of December 9, 1838, when the Afrikaners
importuned God for a victory over their enemies and
promised to commemorate the battle and build the
church. On December 16, with roughly 500 on the
Afrikaner side, led by Andries Pretorius, they fought ten
to twelve thousand Zulu warriors. The Afrikaners won
a great victory without a man killed but some 3000 Zulu
dead: “Afrikaner nationalists of the next century considered Blood River the battle that ‘saved’ the trek and
secured the victory of Christianity and ‘civilization’”
(165).
British industrial imperialism prevailed after the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley and gold in
Witwatersrand, extracting huge profits and, in the gold
area, flooding a nascent Afrikaner republic with “diggers, prostitutes, gamblers, saloon keepers, washerwomen and domestic servants” (236). Despite having given
the trekkers the right to form their own governments—
Zuid Afrikaanische Republiek, ZAR, in 1852 and the
Orange Free State, or OFS, in 1854—the influx of
British immigrants and investors pursuing gold threatened to overrun the ZAR. The Afrikaners protected their
independence with a restrictive franchise that kept voting rights from the Outlanders (Uitlanders) as well as
the blacks and encouraged a new wave of immigrants
from the Netherlands during the 1880s and 1890s. A
tangle of rival interests eventually led to the Anglo-Boer
War, 1899-1902, and the subjugation of the short-lived
Afrikaner republics.
Despite the cruelty of the war and the decimation it
brought upon the Afrikaners, Giliomee does not belabor
that story (250-268). What is striking is that the
Afrikaners came out of the war with leaders, such as Jan
Smuts, who could forgive and forget, assume the posture of loyal British citizens, and yet solidify the
Afrikaner identity with Christian schools in a Kuyperian
response to the challenge of English education (268272). By 1910, the Union of South Africa was formed
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with a constitution that put the Dutch and English languages on an equal official footing in governmental
operations and education. Installed as head of the first
government was Louis Botha, an Afrikaner.
That Dutch language has its own peculiar history in
the story of Afrikaner culture. Having arisen as a spoken language, Afrikaans is often characterized as “mongrel Dutch,” a patois that mixes Dutch, German, French
and local native dialects. English speakers scorned it as
a public language “beneath contempt” (216). By the
diligence of some who insisted that “We write as we
speak” (217), the language took written form. The
Dutch Reformed Church took part in the language controversy, initially opposing Afrikaans as a substitute for
Dutch. But in 1916 its Federal Council commissioned a
translation of the Bible into Afrikaans and in 1919 gave
Afrikaans equal status with the Dutch language in the
church. The first Afrikaans newspaper appeared in
1876. The substantial Dutch newspaper in Cape Town,
De Burger, founded in 1915, became Die Burger in
1922, signaling the transition from Dutch to Afrikaans.
In 1925 Afrikaans replaced Dutch as an official
language, and in 1933 the Afrikaans Bible appeared to
great acclaim (429).
After 1924, with the election of J. B. M. Herzog and
the National Party, the country was almost continuously
in the control of Afrikaner political majorities until the
1990s. During the 1930s, Afrikaners glorified the Boers’
fight against English imperialism and recalled the Great
Trek of the century before with a reenactment: 100,000
Afrikaners celebrated the Blood River battle and laid the
cornerstone for a huge Voortrekker monument on
December 16, 1938. Despite Afrikaner resentment
against the English upper hand in South Africa’s economy, the country supported the Allied cause in World War
II. However, war fatigue and real or imagined victimization of the Afrikaners during the war led to a momentous National Party election victory in 1948. The political preeminence gained over the English and all other
interests put in place a regime that would rule South
Africa with a radical Afrikaner cultural agenda until the
1990s. It was an agenda that solidified and implemented apartheid.
As the sin of Adam and Eve has been in the world
almost from the beginning, the evil that became
apartheid was in South Africa from the earliest
European presence. Jan van Riebeeck arrived in Table
Bay with 90 mostly Dutch settlers in 1652. The first
shipload of slaves arrived in 1658. Together they lived
under the laws of the Netherlands States General and
swore fealty to the Dutch East India Company in a twotiered society: company officials and burghers above
and indentured servants and slaves below. Their church
was the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) of the

Netherlands homeland, and it was the only church at the
Cape for more than a century (5). By 1790, when “a
religious awakening swept over the colony” (42), the
church was “largely a white church.” While Giliomee’s
argument is too long to repeat here, he asserts that
Reformed covenantal theology, articulated at the great
Synod of Dordt, made the baptism of children and
slaves into the church the spiritual responsibility of family patriarchs. That authority became a mechanism for
making and maintaining racial distinctions, exclusivity,
and superiority: “Cape clergies...made no concerted
effort to encourage the baptism of slaves. The clergy had
to wait for fathers or heads of households to bring a
child to the baptismal font” (44).
Children of color, legitimate or not, were rarely presented and less often accepted later as full members by
profession of faith. There was little fervor for evangelizing either slaves or free blacks. By the end of the
eighteenth century, “a few” DRC congregations had
established separate chapels, or gestichten, where “colored Christians” worshipped. In 1824, when the DRC
convened its first colonial synod, its regulations
required that sacraments be administered to the “heathens” in separate congregations (100). The synod of
1857 resolved to “absorb members from the heathen
population into existing congregations” but allowed for
the “heathen” to exercise their privileges in separate
buildings (125). In short, the church sanctioned secondclass status for nonwhite believers as a way to avoid the
strain of social leveling (gelykstelling) that equality in
church would bring to everyday life. In 1880, the DRC
acceded to a proposal from four “colored” chapels to
form the Dutch Reformed Mission Church as an arm of
the DRC (127). In 1910, the DRC in the Orange Free
State used the Mission Church for “colored” as a model
for a black daughter church—separate people, but all
equal before God (456). By 1935, the Federal Council
of the DRC called for Africans and “colored people” to
receive assistance “into self-respecting Christian
nations,” in effect, implementing apartheid ideology
(459). In 1948, the DRC synod of Transvaal justified
apartheid, starting from its mission’s policy; and by
arguing a Kuyperian interpretation of the Genesis rendition of the Tower of Babel, it rationalized racial separation (463).
The 1948 elections put the National Party into power
with overwhelming support from Afrikaners. If the
apartheid plan was incomplete, the prevailing majority
supported racial separation rather than integration. Five
key bases were the following: “political apartheid
restricting all power to whites, the enforced separation
of existing communities, segregated education, protection for whites in the labor market, an influx control that
restricted African movement into the cities.” However,

a sixth base, as Giliomee explains, was central: “the
setting aside of special land areas called reserves
for African residency, later renamed black or Bantu
homelands, or Bantustans for short”(500). The plan
had two kinds of supporters: “crude apartheid racists,
[who] saw the policy as the ideal instrument to keep
blacks and colored down” (513), and “apartheid theorists (some scholars call them apartheid idealists), [who]
believed that apartheid offered more opportunities for
the subordinates than they would get in a common system where they would suffer pervasive discrimination.
Apartheid, the theorists believed, would provide a steadily
expanding field of jobs serving in the subordinate
communities” (514).
A program with sweeping implications, apartheid
was effectuated in the next twenty years to separate and
marginalize the lives and opportunities of the rapidly
multiplying population of nonwhites. Initially prospering, the nation, particularly its white middle class,
enjoyed an economic boom. However, the patterns of
repression imposed upon nonwhites—the forced
removal of “colored people” from District Six in Cape
Town, making blacks into aliens denied land ownership
or movement without passes, the Sharpeville massacre
of 69 blacks in 1960—increasingly brought world
condemnation upon the regime and its dominating white
minority. Still, it was fueled by white resolve and
rationalizations. As late as 1974, the synod of the Dutch
Reformed Church accepted and endorsed the legitimacy
of apartheid by reference to the Tower of Babel and its
relevance for ethnic separation (559). World sanctions
from outside and demographic pressures from within
made repression a failing policy. The DRC articulated a
New Testament view of race in its 1986 and 1990
synods, turning away from its support for apartheid
(620-621). Eventually the white minority, 15 percent of
the actual population in 1991, was led to accept the idea
of power sharing.
If Richard Nixon, the credentialed opponent of
communism, was the right leader to open American
relations with Communist China, then F.W. De Klerk
was the credentialed Afrikaner to negotiate a peaceful
constitutional process that let blacks into the political
system. In 1992 the white electorate was asked, “Do
you endorse the continuation of the reform process
“[...] which is aimed at a new Constitution through
negotiation?” (633-634). With 87 percent voting, 69
percent voted yes. The eventual Constitution provided
a parliamentary system with elections by proportional
representation to a 400-member National Assembly that
elects the president. Nine provinces have limited
powers, and their provincial parliaments elect representatives to a national Council of Provinces.
While the initial Government of National Unity
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began in 1994 with Nelson Mandela as president and
F.W. De Klerk as one of two deputy presidents, the
country made the transition to majority control. The
DRC added its voice to renunciations of apartheid
before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (651).
Eleven languages were given official status, including
Afrikaans, but the very multiplicity of sanctioned languages makes likely the growing preeminence of
English. In a pessimistic statement, Giliomee opines
that "by 2000 it appeared as if Afrikaners had become a
minority linguistic group rather than an organized ethnic
group with myths of origin and kinship, capable of
mobilization as a potent force" (665).
As a recent visitor to starkly beautiful South Africa, I
can report that it is painful to hear distant cousins
express their sense of loss when some of their children
and grandchildren emigrate for economic opportunity to
Europe, North America, Oceania, and other African
nations. Their government bureaucracies, businesses,

and universities may not exclude according to color,
language or, they think, standards of merit. They pay the
bulk of the tax burden to enlarge economic opportunities
for others and for the heavy cost of domestic security.
In addition, they buy guns, electronic alarms, guard
dogs, and protection systems for their homes, businesses, and automobiles. The representation of their interests in the political realm is destined to have minority
status as long as their lives will last. Yet they do live
under a rule of law with civil and religious liberties,
entitled, if with little joy, to free speech and economic
opportunity. They are educated, pragmatic, and
resourceful. Moreover, they are as African as the people of color around them. The burden of the sins of their
fathers and the tasks for integrating themselves into all
aspects of their multicultural society rests upon them
and their children. They may not overcome, but they
need God’s forgiveness and blessing to do more than
survive.

Religion, Economics, and Public Policy by Andrew D. Walsh (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), xii + 158
pages $67.95 cloth. Reviewed by Jonathan Warner, Professor of Economics, Dordt College.
Like many Christians, Andrew Walsh noticed early in
life that people’s religious values seem to make a difference to their views on public policy. In this book, he
seeks to analyze the “culture wars”—the battle for the
hearts and minds of America between, on the one hand,
conservative, orthodox Christians and Jews and, on the
other hand, nominal religionists whose views have been
formed by secular (and often more liberal) elites. The
former group shares a commitment to certain transcendent truths (the truths of religion), which they take to be
a guide to morality and the way to live; the latter group
does not. It is easy to see the way that this division
works out politically: the former group tends to lean
towards laissez-faire capitalism and the views of the
Republican party; the latter tends to lean towards greater
government intervention and the dogmas of the
Democratic party.
Except, of course, this picture is an oversimplification. Not all evangelical Protestants vote Republican;
nor do all secularists vote Democrat. Libertarians, whatever their religious beliefs, will tend to favour the smallgovernment approach of the Republicans; African
American Christians tend to vote Democrat.
Dr. Walsh’s thesis is that the culture-wars hypothesis
is too crude, especially in its analysis of social and economic policy. Is it really true that orthodox Christians
inevitably find that their faith leads them to support free
market economics, or that a loss of faith is associated
with more sympathy for the role of government in the
economy? Dr. Walsh answers this question by examin30 Pro Rege—June 2004

ing the history of relationships between religion and
political economy. To illustrate his arguments, Dr.
Walsh uses the second part of the book to examine the
part played by religious groups in two of the policy
debates of the mid-1990s: health-care reform (the
defeat of “Hillarycare”) and welfare reform (the 1996
amendment providing term limits for government-funded benefits). Walsh has relatively little to say on economics per se, focusing rather on the effects of religious
belief on social policy. However, underlying social policy decisions are some assumptions about economics: as
John Maynard Keynes once commented, “Practical
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of
some defunct economist” (The General Theory 383).
Evangelical Christianity has not always been a friend
of the political right. Dr. Walsh’s account of what he
calls the “ironies of the twentieth century” starts with
William Jennings Bryan, whose concern about the poor
made him an icon of the Democratic party long before
he became a martyr for the fundamentalist cause at the
Scopes monkey trial. And yet, after the failure with the
prohibition experiment, evangelical interest in politics
waned until the rise of the new religious right of the
Christian Coalition and Moral Majority in the 1980s.
While Bryan would stress Jesus’ compassion and concern for the poor (as expressed in the kingdom ethic of
the Sermon on the Mount), the new Christian right
stresses the need for responsibility and accountability.
The sinful nature of mankind means that people will

